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Abstract
From the economic literature on the relationship between economic
growth and environment pioneered by Grossman and Krueger (1991) and
Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992) we first conduct a theoretical and critical
reflection on the existence of a Kuznets curve for biodiversity. It appears
that results are strongly contrasted. Then, we focus on the main biodiver-
sity conservation policies implemented in Africa, i.e. protected areas and we
discuss its e ectiveness in achieving the dual objective of conservation and
economic development for local communities.
Keywords: Economic growth; environmental Kuznets curve; biodiversity
conservations policies; proteced areas; Africa.
JEL classification: Q01, Q50, Q57.
1 Introduction
The Convention on biological diversity (1992) defined biodiversity as :
the variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia,
terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological com-
plexes of which they are part: this includes diversity within species, between
species and of ecosystems.
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We distinguish genetic biodiversity related to the diversity of genetic information
stored in each species, species biodiversity related to the richness and abundance
of species and ecosystem biodiversity related to the ecosystem variability; in the
literature, biodiversity of species retains more attention (Dietz and Adger, 2003;
McPherson and Nieswiadomy, 2005). Biodiversity has huge economic, ecological
and scientific interrelated contributions. In an economic perspective, biodiver-
sity improves productivity of natural ecosystems1 and agricultural activities (Heal,
2004). It enables humanity to be protected against risks of disease and other prob-
lems that could destabilize agricultural systems (e.g. phenomenona of resistance).
Biodiversity is also a source of genetic knowledge; it helps medical scientists to
understand life and the role of each species in maintaining ecosystems. Biodiver-
sity is also essential to intrinsic ecological functions (i.e. the ecological balance)
and ecosystem services. For example, the removal of keystones species2 produces
irreversible consequences for the entire ecosystem. (Batabyal, 2002; Heal, 2004).
Ecosystem services can be merchants (timber production, ecotourism, pharmaceu-
tical uses.) or non-merchants such as watershed protection, carbon sequestration,
soil fertilization (Norton-Gri ths and Southey, 1995; Edwards and Abivardi, 1998;
Batabyal, 2002; Heal, 2004; Pearce, 2007). Biological diversity is undoubtedly an
essential resource for human beings and for the preservation of natural ecosystems;
only a joint ecological and economic management of ecosystem can allow humans
to continue to benefit from its services.
One estimates total number of species between 3 and 100 million (Armsworth
et al., 2004); but unfortunately one observes increasing loss of species as well as
transformation and disappearance of many ecosystems (Mills and Waite, 2009).
Estimates of extinction rates are uncertain; however today, many ecologists argue
that the annual rate of extinction is between 20 to 200 extinctions per million
species, higher than past extinction rates (Pearce, 2007). The main causes of
biodiversity loss are human activities (Edwards and Abivardi, 1998; McPherson
and Nieswiadomy, 2005; Pearce, 2007): destruction of habitats, exploitation of
resources, introduction of new species and climate change, etc. According to
Batabyal (2002), biodiversity preservation requires establishment of a resilient
management system which deals with a threshold of use and an acceptable dis-
turbance allowing system to regain its ecological balance. Some authors such as
Roberts and Grimes (1997), Margules and Pressey (2000), Heal (2004) and Pearce
(2007) rather suggest establishment of worldwide protected areas. The biodiversity
conservation e ort also results through several agreements or conventions includ-
1According to Heal (2004), the research shows that a more diverse ecosystem has more ability
to withstand stress and becomes productive; thereby the loss of biodiversity has a high probability
to decrease ability of the system to maintain or recover from damage or disturbance.
2The keystones species provide unique key services for the functioning of ecosystem (Batabyal,
2002); his determination often leads to better actions in favor of biodiversity protection.
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ing the "big five", i.e. the Convention on wetlands of international importance
especially as waterfowl habitat (or Ramsar 1971), the Convention concerning the
protection of the world cultural and natural heritage (1972), the Convention on
international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora (or CITES 1973),
the Convention on the conservation of the migratory species of wild animals (or
CMS 1979) and the Convetion on biological diversity (or CBD 1992)3.
Africa is not on the sidelines of the global commitment for conservation. The
continent is rich in biodiversity; and so, african countries have been considered
as strategic areas for scientific investigations on choices, means and opportuni-
ties to conservation. Biodiversity conservation policies in Africa presents a major
challenge for sustainable development. However, Lightfoot (1994), Roe and El-
liot (2005) show that other factors act indirectly and create favorable conditions
for biodiversity loss: population growth, distribution and migration of popula-
tion structure, poor governance, poverty and inequality, ine cient macro-economic
policies. But as a rule, most of african countries presente these characteristics. So,
the question to provide or not biodiversity conservation e orts in Africa is relevant.
Fortunately, the extensive economic literature on relationship between eco-
nomic growth and environmental quality initiated by Grossman and Krueger
(1991, 1995) leaves us optimistic. Indeed, it appears an hypothesis that long-run
economic growth would solve the environmental degradation problem (Grossman
and Krueger, 1995; Shafik, 1994; Selden and Song, 1994; Cropper and Gri ths,
1994; Barbier, 1997; Stern et al., 1996). This hypothesis, so-called environmen-
tal Kuznets curve (henceforth EKC), is inspired by the work of Kuznets (1955)
about the existence of an inverted-U-shaped relationship between per capita in-
come and income inequalities. Kuznets points out two stages in the growth of
social inequality in developed economies: first a phase of increase over time with
income up to a peak and then a phase of decline. So, based on empirical ob-
servations related to several developed countries (including United States, United
Kingdom and Germany) Kuznets (1955) established a profile of income disparities
in economic development process. In a similar way, the EKC-concept states that
nation pressure on environment ends up decreasing when a high level of economic
growth is achieved (Grossman and Krueger, 1991, 1995). It implies for example
that african countries will give more interest to the preservation of environment
with economic growth.
In this study the main question is to know whether the EKC hypothesis may
be applied if the variable of environment is a biodiversity index. In other words, is
there a direct relationship between economic growth and biodiversity conservation
3 We can quote other more specialized conventions such as the International convention for
the regulation of whaling (1946), the International convention for the protection of birds (1950),
the African convention on the conservation of nature and natural ressources (1968) and the
Convention on the conservation of European wildlife and natural habitats (1979).
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at long run term? If not, what conservation policies implemented in Africa to
address biodiversity loss? From an general economic literature on bidiversity, we
conduct a theoretical and critical reflection on the existence of a Kuznets curve
for biodiversity and discuss the e ciency of biodiversity conservation policies im-
plemented in african countries; but in a first part we briefly review the economic
literature on the EKC concept.
2 Environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis
2.1 Theoretical arguments
The Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992), Grossman and Krueger (1991, 1995) and
Selden and Song (1994) seminal works mark the beginning of thinking about re-
lationship between development and environment. They use various indicators
of pollution - sulfur dioxide (SO2), carbon oxides (COx), nitrous oxides (NOx),
heavy and fine suspended particulates, pathogenic contamination, heavy metals,
deforestation, etc., in relation with the level of economic development. The EKC
hypothesis states that the level of development, expressed as per capita gross do-
mestic product (GDP), has positive e ect on environment4. The low income coun-
tries have little concern for environment degradation at the first stage of economic
development characterized by subsistence economic activities and industrializa-
tion (Stern et al., 1996); but after satisfying primary needs and improving living
standard, one reaches a threshold of economic development for which awareness
of environment increases. In other words, the use of natural resources to create
one unit of wealth decreases gradually; the e ciency gains are expected to be
large enough to reverse the direction of relationship between economic growth and
degradation (Meunié, 2004).
The theoretical existence of EKC would be an outcome of the both economic
growth and rising of individual incomes; indeed revenue act through changes in
production structures, changes in demand or individual preferences and finally
depend on the institutional and policy framework that prevails in the country
(Grossman and Krueger, 1991, 1995; Plassmann and Khanna, 2006; Nourry, 2007;
Kaika and Zervas, 2013).
The evolution of productive structures following the increase of wealth can
have three e ects highlighted by Grossman and Krueger (1991, 1995): scale e ect,
4EKC hypothesis can be qualified as "econo-centric" vision and therefore is close to “weak
sustainability” concept; in other words, environment is not the support of socio-economic de-
velopment, but rather is simply an common external factor; so there exists possibility of total
substitution between natural capital and manmade capital. For a typology of sustainability
approaches, see Faucheux and Noel (1995, pp. 239-325.)
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composition e ect and technology e ect.
• Scale e ect: is the fact that an increase of goods and services production
leads to more pressure on environment and causes greater pollution as by-
product.
• Composition e ect is due to the change in economy towards cleaner produc-
tion systems; the idea is that the economy tends to change through three
stages of development: rural economy, industrial and urban economy and fi-
nally a more “tertiarized” economy, which is intensive in human capital and
eco-friendly.
• Technological e ect occurs when, from a certain threshold of wealth, the
nation massively invests in R&D for more e cient and cleaner production
techniques. The existence of an EKC presupposes that above an income
threshold, the scale e ect is more than o set by the other two.
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Figure 1: Environmental Kuznets curve
An EKC occurs also owing to changes in demand or consumers preferences
vis-à-vis environmental goods. For instance, Fuentes (2011) focuses on human
preferences and ine ciency of social coordination as the main causes of loss of
biodiversity. According to Plassmann and Khanna (2006), if consumers show any
reduction e ort when they are rich, no sophisticated technology can reduce degra-
dation. In fact with an improvement of their living conditions, individuals give
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more value to environmental amenities (Selden and Song, 1994). So the perception
of the quality of environment plays a role in the declin stage of EKC; ecological
variable becomes an argument of consumers utility function, influences the market
and encourages productive structures to move towards clean processes (Plassmann
and Khanna, 2006; Ranjan and Shortle, 2007). The quality of environment is an-
alyzed as a luxury good: ÁR > 1 or income-elasticity of demand for "green" goods
exceeds the unity (Yandle et al., 2002; Dinda, 2004).
The political aspect of EKC is explained by the negative e ects of corrupt and
less e ective political system on economic growth (Acemoglu et al., 2001). Indeed,
e cient institutions which are capable to impose enforceable and strict regulation
to protect environment of market failures may partly explain pollution mitiga-
tion (Kaika and Zervas, 2013); moreover, with increase of income and information
access, people put pressure on governments to take measures of environment pro-
tection (Nourry, 2007).
Apart from the above classical factors, the theoretical literature gives other
reasons - such as international trade - as an explanation of observation of EKC;
here, the underlying idea is that trade liberalization and mobility of capital allow
economic expansion; however an increase of export goods production generates
pollution and a ects environment quality. Therefore the EKC comes from the
specialization of countries. Indeed, due to the strict costly environmental reg-
ulation in force in rich countries, these ones relocate their polluting industries
toward developing countries. And unfortunately, developing countries with low
environmental standards accept such polluting industries in the aim to promote
foreign direct investment, employment and production. In other words, low income
economies specialize in polluting industries and become "pollution havens" while
rich countries specialize in clean industries (Birdsall and Wheeler, 1993; Neumayer,
2001). However the hypothesis of pollution havens is challenged by another one
called "race to the bottom"; in fact the relocation of industries and the exits of
capital to developing countries will lead to job losses in rich economies, otherwise
they will be forced to relax their regulation and this leads to a race to the bottom
until reaching a low level of protection. This will result in a sharp environmental
deterioration in both rich and developing countries (Porter, 1999; Wheeler, 2001)5.
2.2 Contradictions and criticisms
Several empirical studies incorporating all or part of data used by the pio-
neers show contradictions about EKC-concept. For example Shafik (1994) shows
that the EKC hypothesis is not automatic; Harbaugh et al. (2002) rather shows
5The validity of the two hypothesis, "pollution havens" and "race to the bottom", has been
questioned in the empirical EKC literature.
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a inverted-N shaped relationship, De Bruyn et al. (1998) detects monotonically
increasing relationship between economic growth and emissions, Shafik (1994) and
Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995) show that turning points are higher than maximum
income of sample used. It is generally accepted that the inverted U relationship
is checked for local pollutants such as SO2 and NOx (Stern and Common, 2001;
Stern et al., 1996; Yandle et al., 2002). Emissions of pollutants that have a more
di use impact, such as CO2, continue to increase with growth; thus, here economic
growth contradicts the fight against global warming.
There is also methodological limitations to the existence of an EKC, e.g. im-
pacts of panel composition (Stern and Common, 2001), choice of dependent vari-
able and specification of the econometric model (Bulte and van Soest, 2001), neg-
ligence of irreversibility of envionmental damages (Arrow et al., 1995) and phe-
nomenon of simultaneity (Stern et al., 1996). In addition, according to Roberts
and Grimes (1997) the inverted U-shaped could be the result of two divergent and
juxtaposed trends and not the path of individual countries following various stages
of development. The irreversibility means there is no return to the old balance
once ecosystem’s carrying capacity is exceeded; the simultaneity means there is po-
tential feedback e ects of pollution on economic growth; in other words, pollution
a ects health, labor productivity and natural resources (Nourry, 2007). Therefore
a search for a rapid economic expansion at the expense of natural resources may
be counterproductive; the idea of an EKC is not a systematic and general result.
3 Kuznets curve for biodiversity
Few empirical works really analyze the existence of a Kuznets curve for biodiversity.
When they do it, most of them are specifically interested in deforestation rates as
indicator of biodiversity loss. Cropper and Gri ths (1994) examine the e ect of
demographic pressure on deforestation in 64 countries in Africa, Latin America
and Asia over the period 1961-1991. They use a quadratic panel model and show
the existence of an EKC only for Africa and Latin America with respective turning
points at 4,760 $US and 5,420 $US; the authors also find that the average income
of these countries are below these peaks; they deduce that countries are on the first
part of the Kuznets curve. These results were confirmed by the work of Bhattarai
and Hammig (2001), but here the turning points are much higher than those of
Cropper and Gri ths (1994). Similarly, Culas (2007) highlights the existence
of an EKC for deforestation in Latin America countries and the key role played
by institutional factors in mitigating deforestation. In contrast, other works on
deforestation contradict the existence of an EKC for biodiversity; for example,
Shafik (1994) and Koop and Tole (1999) use other estimation methods and invalid
the existence of Kuznets curve for deforestation; Nguyen and Azomahou (2003)
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use a panel model in which they focus on spatial interactions of indicators of
deforestation; with a sample of 85 developing countries (Africa, Latin America
and Asia-Oceania) over the period 1961 to 1994, they show that per capita income
growth rate has no relevant e ect for all groups; the relationship between GDP and
deforestation is "anti-Kuznets" i.e. U-shaped. In another study, the same authors
introduce new variables such as access to information, political institutions and
trade, use semiparametric models and invalide the hypothesis of Kuznets curve for
biodiversity.
In addition to studies on forest biodiversity, literature is interested in bio-
diversity of animal species. Naidoo and Adamowicz (2001), McPherson and
Nieswiadomy (2005) and Kerr and Currie (1995) analyze the relationship between
economic growth and the number of endangered species; results are very mixed;
while Naidoo and Adamowicz (2001) and McPherson and Nieswiadomy (2005) find
evidence of EKC for mammals and birds threatened, Kerr and Currie (1995) iden-
tify a monotonic relationship where the rate of mammals and endangered birds
decreases with economic growth. Dietz and Adger (2003) emphasize the disadvan-
tage of using the number of threatened species as a measure of biodiversity loss;
for them, the number of threatened species is a pressure indicator on biodiversity
and not of biodiversity loss. Then they built a biodiversity proxy (species richness)
using Arrhenius law6 to estimate biodiversity loss. Their results show that there
is no Kuznets curve for biodiversity; indeed the mechanism of species extinction
is much faster than the renewal mechanism or creation of new species; there is
no turning point in the relationship between biodiversity and per capita income.
Biodiversity loss is essentially irreversible and monotonous. These results point in
the same direction as those of Asafu-Adjaye (2003). Finally more recently, Mills
and Waite (2009) re-analyze the data used by Dietz and Adger (2003) by using
a quantile regression and a spatial filtering; their results argue the presence or
absence of a proof of a Kuznets curve is an insubstantial and simplistic informa-
tion to draw conclusions about income-biodiversity relationship. Therefore, they
advocate further exploration to understand mechanisms by which income a ects
biodiversity; they discourage also the use of the hypothesis of a Kuznets curve for
biodiversity in defining public policies for biodiversity conservation.
As it is clear from the literature review, results about Kuznets curve for biodi-
versity are mixed. Economic growth does not seem to be necessarily the solution
of biodiversity loss. Also, note that the Kuznets curve for biodiversity is subject to
the same criticism as environment: irreversibility, model specification, selection of
indicators, simultaneity, etc. Otherwise environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis
6S = cAz with S: number of species, A forest area, c: constant reflecting the density of species
per unit of area, z: slope of the relationship between S and A expressed in logarithm and its
value range is 0.15 and 0.35.
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assumes a perfect knowledge of "environmental good" or enough information to
consumers to express their preferences; it is not the case for the good "biodiver-
sity"; indeed, biodiversity remains somewhat appropriate and a distant concept of
people’s concerns. Besides, the scientific community has been really aware of the
benefits of biodiversity and ecosystem services recently. Even though various re-
gional and international agreements promote biodiversity protection, it still takes
a lot of time for this to be apparent to many people. Today, biodiversity conser-
vation is mainly through management of protected areas policy. We will describe
the principles of this policy and discuss its e ectiveness in Africa.
4 Biodiversity conservation policies in Africa
Protected areas are key elements of any strategy for biodiversity conservation of
a country or region (Margules and Pressey, 2000; Doumenge et al., 2001); this
is particularly true in Africa which is rich in biodiversity. According to the In-
ternational Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN)7, a
protected area is:
a clearly defined geographical space, recognised, dedicated and managed,
through legal or other e ective means, to achieve the long-term conservation
of nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural values (Dudley,
2008).
It shows that a protected area (national parks, monuments, nature reserves,
etc.) globally aims conservation of species and their genetic variability and thus
first maintaining natural processes and ecosystems that sustain life. The "2014
United Nations List of Protected Areas" contains just over 209,000 protected areas
with a total 3.4% of the world’s marine area and 14% of the world’s terrestrial,
covering a total area of 32,8 million Km2. On African continent in particular,
protected areas represent 14 % of terrestrial areas and 2.4 % of marine areas; sites
are generally very large and cover 15 % of the world’s area protected (Deguignet
et al., 2014). Biodiversity conservation in Africa is a priority8. Indeed the continent
is a unique heritage for the future and many communities still rely on today. Africa
remains one of the most important continents in experimentation of management
models of conservation policies and wildlife; this has prompted creation of national
7Also, note that the IUCN brings together all protected areas into six management categories;
these categories provide a kind of common language and framework for creation, planning and
regulation of protected areas. The guidelines for applying protected area management categories
are reported in Dudley (2008).
8For example, to enhance conservation in Africa, it was adopted in 2010, with the support of
the Convention on diversity, a strategic plan on biological diversity 2011-2020 accompanied by
20 ambitious goals called "Aichi Targets".
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parks and protected areas during and after colonization (Korahiré, 2009). In terms
of planning, in the last two decades, biodiversity conservation policies in Africa
have moved from "fortress conservation" approach to "new conservation" approach
(Mengué-Medou, 2002; Guéneau and Jacobée, 2005; Hoon, 2008).
The "fortress conservation" was characterized by a monopoly control of cen-
tral government, exclusion of local populations and prohibition of traditional uses
of fauna and flora. Exclusion is done without subsidies, nor reciprocities or as-
sistances to local people who derive most of their livelihoods from nature; local
populations are considered a direct threat to maintaining biodiversity. So, they
felt threatened and expropriation victims of their lands and rights (Nelson, 2004).
The fortress approach is qualified "green imperialism" or "top-down" conservation;
it resulted in a rift between environmentalists and local communities (Igoe, 2004);
i.e. the creation of protected areas was done in pain. However, this approach
was vigorously fought because he did not consider costs of damage caused to local
communities (Hoon, 2008); restrictions aroused misunderstandings, revolts and
predatory behaviors opposed to conservation (infiltration for farming, poaching,
grazing of livestock.). There was a real conflict between conservation programs
and the needs of local people. Tanzania’s Tarangire National Park created in 1970
by central government in disregard of needs and culture of local Maasai people is
an example; they are prohibited from accessing water sources and pasture land in
game reserves. We can also mention the Djoudj National Bird Sanctuary in Sene-
gal created in 1971 after evacuation of entire villages, the National Park Omo,
one of the nine national parks Ethiopia whose boundaries and recovery in 2005 by
private sector still threatens local populations (Triplet, 2009).
The "new conservation" or "community-based conservation", initiated in the
late 80s and widely adopted in the 90s, is based on participation and strengthen-
ing capacity of local people in conservation objectives. According to Hulme and
Murphree (1999), it involves transition from a centralized governance to a local
participatory governance, a revision of the concept of conservation by taking into
account the concept of sustainable development and finally the incorporation of
liberal ideas and the use of market forces to finance conservation. It also em-
phasizes recognition of the rights of local communities without which achieving
biodiversity conservation objectives would be di cult (Nelson, 2004). The par-
ticipation of local communities through co-management becomes an institutional
way of reconciling on one hand, people with environmentalists and on the other
hand, conservation and development (Haller et al., 2008). Thus, many donors
such as USAID, GTZ, World Bank and NGOs have funded integrated projects
of conservation and development (or IPCDs) - such as ecotourism, exploration of
biodiversity, extraction of non-timber forest products - initiated by local popula-
tions (Ferraro and Simpson, 2003). The Tafi Atome Monkey Sanctuary created in
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Ghana in 1996 is a good example; the local communities work as tourist guides,
shops owners, etc; many other projects IPCDs9 were introduced in the early 1990s
in Southern Africa, including Zimbabwe, Zambia, Namibia and Botswana10. How-
ever, although praised by ecologists and social scientists as the most accurate of
the two conservation approaches, "community-based conservation" is severely crit-
icized: low added value for local people, short-term vision, IPCDs worsen conser-
vation problems because they generate new inhabitants and therefore population
pressure and over-exploitation of resources, persistence of competition problems
between hunting and agriculture, ambiguous e ects on incentives for conservation,
etc (Ferraro and Simpson, 2003; Guéneau and Jacobée, 2005).
In the 2000s, these criticisms have led to a resurgence of strict protectionist
paradigm, similar to the fortress approach but specially an emergence of a new
approach extending the new conservation concept and considering biodiversity as a
merchant good (Conrad and Ferraro, 2001; Ferraro and Simpson, 2002, 2003); the
idea is to o set the relative costs of conservation through direct aid to local people
rather than encourage, through subsidies, alternative activities such as ecotourism
(Guéneau and Jacobée, 2005). According to Ferraro and Simpson (2003), it is sim-
ply to encourage conservation by paying directly for "conservation performance";
direct payments have already been successfully tested in high-income countries.
Obviously to be e ective, direct transfers will exceed the benefits derived from the
destruction of biodiversity; there would be a kind of "commodification" of biodiver-
sity. In the literature, one talks about "market-oriented" conservation approach.
Crook and Clapp (1998, 2002) emphasize that biodiversity loss is due to market
failures problems; for them, e ective conservation must be done through formal-
ization and expansion of markets for biodiversity. Although the idea of direct
payments is still hypothetical for protected areas planning in Africa, according to
ICEM (2003) soon we’ll see its implementation.
5 Concluding discussions
"Protected area" does not always mean "e ective protection"; many protected areas
are ine ective (Triplet, 2009); however, measuring the e ectiveness of protected
areas, especially in Africa, can be a quite complex task because of many factors
9Some agencies or authors prefer speaking more generally about projects or programs Com-
munity based-natural resources management (CBNRM) or Wildlife community management
(WCM) (Hughes and Flintan, 2001). IPCDs projects must be financially attractive to local
communities, economically viable for nations and reasonable for donors (Barnes et al., 2002).
10The Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE)
in Zimbabwe, the Luangwa Integradted Resources Development Project (LIRDP) in Zambia,
the Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP) in Botswana (Hoon, 2008) and CBNRM initiatives in
Namibia.
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that may be taken into account. In our view, three essential points to be taken
into account to improve their e ectiveness: integration of economic aspects of con-
servation, increased financial incentives and operationalization of the institutional
and legal framework of conservation plans.
Recent literature explicitly states that the economic aspects often have been
ignored in the methods for identifying priorities of diversity conservation (Naidoo
et al., 2006; Adams et al., 2010; Chiozza et al., 2010). Indeed, systematic con-
servation planning has long been the preserve of biologists and ecologists; they
often ignore the trade-o  between costs and benefits of conservation in the anal-
ysis of e ectiveness of policy (Hauer et al., 2010). Furthermore, most of African
countries su er from lack of spatial economic informations for the analysis. Yet,
integration of conservation costs including opportunity cost11 are important and
a ect conservation policies results. For example Chiozza et al. (2010) show that
integrate opportunity costs in conservation planning allow to identify sites to be
added to existing sites in achieving objective of protecting mammals and amphib-
ians in Uganda and also to reduce conflicts between economic development and
conservation. The analysis of e ectiveness of conservation policies needs a mon-
etary valuation of benefits and costs; the quantification task is not always easy
despite several methods developed in environmental economics. Then, authors
such as Norton-Gri ths and Southey (1995), Ferraro and Simpson (2002), Barnes
et al. (2002), Lindsey et al. (2005), Siikamäki and Layton (2006) and Chiozza et al.
(2010) use a cost-e ectiveness analysis instead a cost-benefit analysis. For exam-
ple Norton-Gri ths and Southey (1995) use approximations and show that the
net profit of conservation in Kenya is below its opportunity cost; in other words,
there is a competition between alternative activities and biodiversity conservation,
and when demand for alternative uses is very high, it raises questions about rel-
evance of creation mechanisms for protected areas. Thus it is clear that costs of
conservation should be integrated early in planning process.
At the institutional and legal level, most African countries have a satisfac-
tory framework12 for protected areas. However, despite abundance of laws and
institutions, the framework is often ine ective and less strictly enforced for man-
agement of protected areas, and especially when there are economic interests.
Pearce (2007) rightly points that the most biodiversity-rich countries are the same
which have poor governance and high levels of corruption; for example, a study
11When you decide to create protected area, you exclude and restrict immediately the use of
the site for profitable alternative economic activities. The net profits of the most cost-e ective al-
ternative activity represent the opportunity cost of the conservation project (Barton et al., 2013);
in addition to opportunity costs, one includes acquisition costs, management costs, transaction
costs, damage costs.
12Some countries like Ghana and Burkina Faso have even registered conservation priorities of
nature in their Constitution.
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of UICN/PACO (2012) on actors and governances of protected areas in West
Africa shows that the types of "o cial" governance13 formalized by laws and regu-
lations are really in inadequacy with daily practice. While we strongly advocates
involvement of local communities in management and decision-making, we find
that the management is still centralized by public authorities with insu cient re-
sources. It also requires that creation mechanisms for protected areas, taking into
account the dual objective of conservation and local socio-economic development,
are supervised by laws and regulations14 to avoid past mistakes15. Moreover, the
institutional framework must favor environmental collective awareness of African
people and their policy-makers; it must also support public-private collaboration
and political stability for biodiversity conservation.
The last aspect of our thinking is related to the funding of conservation. Fund-
ing opportunities provided by law in each African country remain below the real
needs for protected areas. According to Nelson (2004), many countries spend less
than 20% of annual investment needed for e cient conservation. The lack of fund-
ing to cover the costs of biodiversity conservation is one of the main factors limiting
e ciency. The use of markets of environmental services to improve private sector
contribution to conservation and the establishment of permanent funds may be
ways to remedy this problem; a depth reflection on direct payments should be
seriously considered.
To conclude, note that the literature does neither invalidate nor confirm the
existence of a Kuznets curve for biodiversity. Thus, economic growth is far from
being systematic solution to biodiversity loss. However, the e ort of conservation is
not zero but is characterized by proactive conservation policies such as protection
of areas around the world and especially in Africa, a continent rich in biodiversity.
Although the e ectiveness of protected areas in Africa is often questioned, they
continue to play a key role in biodiversity conservation; considering the above re-
flections will undoubtedly help improve their e ciency. Moreover, further research
on the determinants of conservation e ort will provide essential informations to
analyze the sustainability of protected areas and local economic development.
13IUCN recognizes four types of governance or structures of management of decision power
about protected area: governance by government, by cooperative arrangements, by private en-
tities and finally by local communities (Dudley, 2008). These four "o cial" types of governance
are represented in Africa.
14Increasingly, one favors legislation when creation of protected areas is for nations; it is the
case in Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast (UICN/PACO, 2010)
15Indeed, Mengué-Medou (2002) and Guéneau and Jacobée (2005) argued that some protected
areas in Africa are created not on ecological considerations but economic and political or simply
because lands consist only of little interest for other uses (i.e. landlocked areas or areas serving
as refuges for emblematic species). Also, there are protected areas that are only created on paper
but not physically (Triplet, 2009).
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